And finally,as it is not enough,before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live,that it be pulled down,and materials and builders provided,or that we engage in the work ourselves,according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out,but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations,so that I might not remain irresolute in my actions,while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement,and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity,I formed a provisory code of morals,composed of three or four maxims,with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.
The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country,adhering firmly to the faith in which,by the grace of God,I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions,and the farthest removed from extremes,which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living.For as I had from that time begun to hold my own opinions for nought because I wished to subject them all to examination,I was convinced that I could not do better than follow in the meantime the opinions of the most judicious;and although there are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese as judicious as among ourselves,expediency seemed to dictate that I should regulate my practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should have to live;and it appeared to me that,in order to ascertain the real opinions of such,I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practised than of what they said,not only because,in the corruption of our manners,there are few disposed to speak exactly as they believe,but also because very many are not aware of what it is that they really believe;for,as the act of mind by which a thing is believed is different from that by which we know that we believe it,the one act is often found without the other.
Also,amid many opinions held in equal repute,I chose always the most moderate,as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient for practice,and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious),as that,in the event of my falling into error,I might be at less distance from the truth than if,having chosen one of the extremes,it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted.And Iplaced in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat of our freedom is abridged;not that I disapproved of the laws which,to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution,when what is sought to be accomplished is some good,permit engagements by vows and contracts binding the parties to persevere in it,or even,for the security of commerce,sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent:but because I did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change,and because,for myself in particular,I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments,and not to suffer them to deteriorate,I would have deemed it a grave sin against good sense,if,for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time,I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time,when perhaps it had ceased to be so,or I had ceased to esteem it such.
My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able,and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions,when once adopted,than if they had been highly certain;imitating in this the example of travelers who,when they have lost their way in a forest,ought not to wander from side to side,far less remain in one place,but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible,without changing their direction for slight reasons,although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection;for in this way,if they do not exactly reach the point they desire,they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest.In the same way,since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible,it is very certain that,when it is not in our power to determine what is true,we ought to act according to what is most probable;and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another,we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other,and afterwards consider it,in so far as it relates to practice,as no longer dubious,but manifestly true and certain,since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities.This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as,destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice,allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best,which they abandon the next,as the opposite.
