Introspection is of a larger sort in our day.There is a world of things in the mind worth looking at， and the modern psychologist， instead of fixing his attention wholly on an extreme form of speculative self-consciousness， puts his mind through an infinite variety of experiences， intellectual and emotional， simple and complex， normal and abnormal， sociable and private， recording in each case what he sees in it.He does this by subjecting it to suggestions or incitements of various kinds， which awaken the activities he desires to study.
In particular he does it largely by what may be called sympathetic introspection， putting himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons and allowing them to awake in himself a life similar to their own， which he afterwards， to the best of his ability， recalls and describes.In this way he is more or less able to understand梐lways by introspection梒hildren， idiots， criminals， rich and poor， conservative and radical梐ny phase of human nature not wholly alien to his own.
This I conceive to be the principal method of the social psychologist.
One thing which this broader introspection reveals is that the " I "-consciousness does not explicitly appear until the child is， say， about two years old， and that when it does appear it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group.It is in fact simply one phase of a body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.
The mental experience of a new-born child is probably a mere stream of impressions， which may be regarded as being individual， in being differentiated from any other stream？ or as social， in being an undoubted product of inheritance and suggestion from human life at large；but is not aware either of itself or of society.
Very soon， however， the mind begins to discriminate personal impressions and to become both naively self-conscious and naively conscious of society； that is， the child is aware， in an unreflective way， of a group and of his own special relation to it.He does not say "I" nor does he name his mother， his sister or his nurse， but he has images and feelings out of which these ideas will grow.Later comes the more reflective consciousness which names both himself and other people， and brings a fuller perception of the relations which constitute the unity of this small world.
And so on to the most elaborate phases of self-consciousness and social consciousness， to the metaphysician pondering the Ego， or the sociologist meditating on the Social Organism.Self and society go together， as phases of a common whole.I am aware of the social groups in which I live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself；and Descartes might have said "We think，" cogitamus ， on as good grounds as he said cogito.
But， it may be said， this very consciousness that you are considering is after all located in a particular person， and so are all similar consciousnesses， so that what we see， if we take an objective view of the matter， is merely an aggregate of individuals， however social those individuals may be.Common-sense， most people think， assures us that the separate person is the primary fact of life.
If so， is it not because common-sense has been trained by custom to look at one aspect of things and not another ？ Common-sense， moderately informed， assures us that the individual has his being only as part of a whole.What does not come by heredity comes by communication and intercourse； and the more closely we look the more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye and community the inner truth."Social organism，" using the term in no abstruse sense but merely to mean a vital unity in human life， is a fact as obvious to enlightened common-sense as individuality.
I do not question that the individual is a differentiated centre of psychical life， having a world of his own into which no other individual can fully enter； living in a stream of thought in which there is nothing quite like that in any other stream， neither his "I，" nor his "you，" nor his "we，" nor even any material object； all， probably， as they exist for him， have something unique about them.But this uniqueness is no more apparent and verifiable than the fact -- not at all inconsistent with it梩hat he is in the fullest sense member of a whole， appearing such not only to scientific observation but also to his own untrained consciousness.
