There are not three separate forces,conflicting like three independent forces,but a complex set of social institutions bound together into a whole.It is impossible really to regard government as a permanent balance of antagonistic forces,confronting each other like the three duellists in Sheridan's Critic .The practical result of that theory is to substitute for the 'greatest happiness'principle the vague criterion of the preservation of an equilibrium between indefinable forces;and to make the ultimate end of government the maintenance as long as possible of a balance resting on no ulterior principle,but undoubtedly pleasant for the comfortable classes.Nothing is left but the rough guesswork,which,if a fine name be wanted,may be called Baconian induction.The 'matchless constitution,'as Bentham calls it,represents a convenient compromise,and the tendency is to attach exaggerated importance to its ostensible terms.When Macaulay asserted against Mill 39that it was impossible to say which element --monarchy,aristocracy,or democracy --had gained strength in England in the last century,he is obviously looking at the formula and not at the social body behind.
This leads to considerations really more important than the argumentation about a priori and inductive methods.Mill in practice knew very well the qualifications necessary before his principles applied.He showed it in his Indian evidence;and Place could have told him,had it required telling,that the actual political machinery worked by very strange and tortuous methods.Yet he was content to override such considerations when he is expounding his theory,and laid himself open to Macaulay's broad common-sense retort.The nation at large cannot,he says,have a 'sinister interest.'It must desire legislation which is beneficial to the whole.This is to make the vast assumption that every individual will desire what is good for all,and will be a sufficient judge of what is good.But is it clear that a majority will even desire what is good for the whole?May they not wish to sacrifice both other classes and coming generations to their own instantaneous advantages?Is it plain that even enlightenment of mind would induce a poor man to see his own advantage in the policy which would in the long run be best for the whole society?You are bound,said Macaulay,to show that the poor man will not believe that he personally would benefit by direct plunder of the rich;and indeed that he would not be right in so believing.The nation,no doubt,would suffer,but in the immediate period which alone is contemplated by a selfish pauper,the mass of the poor might get more pleasure out of confiscation.
Will they not,on your own principles,proceed to confiscation?Shall we not have such a catastrophe as the reign of terror?The Westminster Review er retorted by saying that Macaulay prophesied a reign of terror as a necessary consequence of an extended franchise.Macaulay,skilfully enough,protested against this interpretation.'We say again and again,'he declares,'that we are on the defensive.We do not think it necessary to prove that a quack medicine is poison.Let the vendor prove it to be sanative.We do not pretend to show that universal suffrage is an evil.
Let its advocates show it to be a good.'40Mill rests his whole case upon the selfishness of mankind.Will not the selfishness lead the actual majority at a given moment to plunder the rich and to disregard the interests of their own successors?
Macaulay's declaration that he was only 'upon the defensive'might be justifiable in an advocate.His real thought may be inferred from a speech on the charter made in 1842.
The chartists'petition of that year had asked for universal suffrage.
Universal suffrage,he replies,would be incompatible with the 'institution of property.'41If the chartists acted upon their avowed principles,they would enforce 'one vast spoliation.'Macaulay could not say,of course,what would actually result,but his 'guess'was that we should see 'something more horrible than can be imagined something like the siege of Jerusalem on a far larger scale.'The very best event he could anticipate --'and what must the state of things be,if an Englishman and a Whig calls such an event the very best?'--would be a military despotism,giving a 'sort of protection to a miserable wreck of all that immense glory and prosperity.'42So in the criticism of Mill he had suggested that if his opponent's principles were correct,and his scheme adopted,'literature,science,commerce,manufactures'would be swept away,and that a 'few half-naked fishermen would divide with the owls and foxes the ruins of the greatest of European cities.'43Carefully as Macaulay Guards himself in his articles upon Mill,the speech shows sufficiently what was his 'guess';that is,his real expectation.This gives the vital difference.
What Macaulay professes to deduce from Mill's principles he really holds himself,and he holds it because he argues,as indeed everybody has to argue,pretty much on Mill's method.He does not really remain in the purely sceptical position which would correspond to his version of 'Baconian induction.'
He argues,just as Mill would have argued,from general rules about human nature.Selfish and ignorant people will,he thinks,be naturally inclined to plunder.Therefore,if they have power,they will plunder.So Mill had argued that a selfish class would rule for its own sinister interests and therefore not for the happiness of the greatest number.The argument is the same,and it is the only line of argument which is possible till,if that should ever happen,a genuine science of politics shall have been constituted.The only question is whether it shall take the pomp of a priori speculation or conceal itself under a show of 'Baconian induction.'
On one point they agree.
